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FAMILY LAW, PLURALISM, AND HUMAN RIGHTS
Ann Laquer Estin*
Contemporary human rights law builds on a theoretical foundation laid
during the Enlightenment, which emphasized the types of civil and political
rights that were at the center of the American and French Revolutions of the
late eighteenth century.1 This conception of human rights extended only to
male citizens, who were understood to be the heads of households, and did not
address the rights of women or children or the possibility that families could be
sites of oppression.2 A more universal vision of human rights expanded
through the nineteenth and into the twentieth century, slowly extending to
women and children. Traditional laws of domestic relations have gradually
been transformed to match this new understanding.
Family law in the United States and Canada traces its roots to England,
where the common law and Christian ecclesiastical law shaped families based
on a norm of monogamous marriage, without divorce, in which fathers and
husbands wielded authority over the bodies and property of their wives and
children.3 These traditions were adjusted in the New World, where church
courts had no official authority, but the transition to a legal regime in which
married women have full legal rights has taken centuries.4 This process was by
no means complete when the United Nations (“UN”) adopted the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights5 in 1948, or when those principles were
incorporated into human rights law in 1966 with the UN Bill of Rights,
comprised of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural

*

Aliber Family Chair in Law, University of Iowa College of Law.
MICHELINE R. ISHAY, THE HISTORY OF HUMAN RIGHTS FROM ANCIENT TIMES TO THE GLOBALIZATION
ERA 64–66 (2d ed. 2008).
2 See SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, WOMEN IN WESTERN POLITICAL THOUGHT 99–105, 197–230 (1979).
3 See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, THE COMMENTARIES OF SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE ON THE LAWS AND
CONSTITUTION OF ENGLAND 433–45, 446–57 (2009); HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC
RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 21–25 (2d ed. 1988).
4 See NANCY F. COTT, PUBLIC VOWS: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION (2000); MARY ANN
MASON, FROM FATHER’S PROPERTY TO CHILDREN’S RIGHTS (1996) (chronicling the development of women’s
rights concerning child custody).
5 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10,
1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration].
1
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Rights (“ICESCR”)6 and the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (“ICCPR”).7 Those instruments mandated that men and women should
have both the right to marry and equal rights in marriage, and addressed the
protection of children by requiring that there should be no discrimination based
on a child’s birth in or out of wedlock. Seen against the backdrop of American
family law of the time, these were idealistic, aspirational statements
envisioning a reality that had not been achieved.8
Despite its roots in ecclesiastical tradition, contemporary family law in the
United States and Canada maintains a clear separation between civil and
religious authority over families. Secular laws have abandoned some aspects of
Christian tradition, such as the prohibition on divorce, and maintained others,
notably the prohibition of polygamy. These legal systems generally provide for
separation of church and state,9 and from the perspective of the state any
obligations of religious law are purely voluntary. Family law creates a space
for couples to contract a civil marriage in a religious ceremony, but the state
defines who may marry and maintains a monopoly over the dissolution of civil
marriage.10
Until recent years, authorities in the United States gave little serious
consideration to the marriage and family traditions of other religious groups. In
1879, the U.S. Supreme Court had harsh words for the religiously based
polygamy of Mormons in the Utah Territory, linking the practice to
“despotism” and racializing polygamy as “a feature of the life of Asiatic and of

6 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3
[hereinafter ICESCR].
7 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter
ICCPR]. The ICCPR was ratified by the United States in 1992.
8 Constitutional decisions addressing these equality issues in the United States begin with Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968), and Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). See
also Susan Moller Okin, Feminism, Women’s Human Rights, and Cultural Differences, 13 HYPATIA 32, 33
(1998).
9 In the United States, religious freedom is protected by the First Amendment to the Constitution, which
includes a prohibition on establishment of religion. Section 2(a) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms guarantees freedom of conscience and religion, but these rights also have a much longer history. See
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the
Canada Act, 1982, c. 11 (U.K.) [hereinafter Canadian Charter], available at http://lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/
charter; Beverly McLachlin, Freedom of Religion and the Rule of Law: A Canadian Perspective, in
RECOGNIZING RELIGION IN A SECULAR SOCIETY: ESSAYS IN PLURALISM, RELIGION, AND PUBLIC POLICY 12,
28–33 (Douglas Farrow ed., 2004).
10 See generally Ann Laquer Estin, Unofficial Family Law, 94 IOWA L. REV. 449 (2009) (discussing the
interplay between secular and religious law in the context of marriage dissolutions).
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African people.”11 Courts today accommodate cultural and religious diversity
more generously, but always within a larger framework of law requiring
nondiscrimination, freedom of conscience, gender equality, and protections for
dependent or vulnerable family members. In this context, although the
unofficial family law of customary and religious authorities has important
consequences for individuals and families, those authorities have not been able
to enlist the coercive machinery of the state to enforce their orders.12 This type
of pluralism, characteristic of the United States and Canada, poses significantly
different questions than the pluralism of nations in which customary or
religious law is backed by the authority of the state.
Part I of this Essay surveys the key human rights protections relevant to
family law, including the right to culture and religion, marriage rights, and the
rights of women and children in families. Part II considers the tension between
religiously specific understandings of marriage and family and broad
conceptions of human rights, focusing on two types of challenges. First, human
rights law requires governments to accommodate the family practices of
distinct cultural and religious groups, but governments must also protect the
individual rights of family members from infringement by religious groups
exercising state-backed authority. This would be difficult to accomplish in the
United States and Canada, where state supervision of religious tribunals would
violate constitutional norms of religious freedom. A second difficulty, typical
of circumstances in which customary or religious leaders exercise official
authority over group members, is that human rights norms also require
governments to define the limits of group authority and the boundaries of
group membership. For the groups themselves, these boundary questions are
strongly shaped by religious and family law. But when boundaries are policed
by the state, membership issues also implicate human rights norms and explicit
pluralism raises difficult questions concerning the rights of citizenship.
Moreover, to the extent that pluralism breaks a nation into separate bounded
groups, subject to different legal rights and obligations, it weakens the bonds
between communities and the sense of belonging to the broader society.

11

Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1879); cf. Cleveland v. United States. 329 U.S. 14, 26
(1946) (Murphy, J., dissenting) (arguing that polygyny, “like other forms of marriage, is basically a cultural
institution rooted deeply in the religious beliefs and social mores of those societies in which it appears”). In the
U.K. context, see also Hyde v. Hyde and Woodmansee (1866) 1 L.R.P. & D. 130 (Eng.).
12 Proposals to integrate civil and religious law in the setting of divorce have been controversial and
largely unsuccessful. See Estin, supra note 10, at 467–70.
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I. HUMAN RIGHTS AND FAMILY LAW
The Universal Declaration embraces the proposition that “[t]he family is
the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection
by society and the State.”13 This principle is repeated in the ICESCR and the
ICCPR,14 and recognized in regional instruments such as the 1950 European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
(“ECHR”)15 and the 1981 African Charter on Human and People’s Rights.16
Broad international consensus on the importance of “the family” elides wide
differences within and between societies on the shape and meaning of family
life.17 Moreover, it masks the possibility that protection for family life will
pose other human rights dilemmas, particularly for women and children who
have special vulnerabilities in family settings.18
A. Rights to Culture and Religion
Two provisions in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights frame the
discussion of religious and cultural pluralism. The nondiscrimination principle
in Article 2 provides that the rights and freedoms of the declaration apply to
everyone, “without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language,
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or
other status.”19 Article 18 articulates a religious freedom principle, extending
freedom of thought, conscience, and religion to everyone, specifically
including the freedom to change religion or belief.20 This vision of religious
freedom includes an individual’s right “either alone or in community with
others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching,
practice, worship, and observance.”21 These rights were made legally binding
in the ICESCR22 and the ICCPR.23 Article 27 of the ICCPR states that
13

Universal Declaration, supra note 5, art. 16(3).
ICESCR, supra note 6, art. 10(1); ICCPR, supra note 7, art. 23(1).
15 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 8, Nov. 4,
1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter ECHR].
16 African Charter on Human and People’s Rights, O.A.U. Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 Rev. 5, art. 18(1),
(June 26, 1981).
17 Cf. Philip Alston, The Best Interests Principle: Toward a Reconciliation of Culture and Human
Rights, 8 INT’L J.L. & FAM. 1, 5 (1994).
18 See Okin, supra note 8, at 41–42 (analyzing the difficulties for human rights law as idealized notions
of the family).
19 Universal Declaration, supra note 5, art. 2.
20 Id. art. 27.
21 Id.
22 ICESCR, supra note 6, arts. 2(2), 13(3).
14
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members of ethnic, religious, or linguistic minority groups “shall not be denied
the right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their
own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to use their own
language.”24 Under ICCPR Article 18(3), freedom of religious worship,
observance, practice, and teaching “may be subject only to such limitations as
are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health,
or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others.”25 For countries
such as the United States, this language suggests an obligation to define a
neutral justification for any laws that prohibit religious practices such as
polygamy.
B. Marriage As a Human Right
As framed in the Universal Declaration, marriage rights have three
dimensions, including the right to marry, equal rights within marriage, and
consent to marriage.26 The first two are addressed in Article 16(1), which
states: “Men and women of full age, without any limitation due to race,
nationality or religion, have the right to marry and to found a family. They are
entitled to equal rights as to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution.”27
The equality norm is carried forward into the ICCPR28 and elaborated further
in the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women (“CEDAW”).29
International law also seeks to eradicate forced marriages and child
marriages. Article 16(2) of the Universal Declaration, states that “[m]arriage
shall be entered into only with the free and full consent of the intending
spouses.”30 These protections are implemented in the 1962 UN Convention on
23

ICCPR, supra note 7, arts. 2(1), 2(18).
Id. art. 27; see also Convention on the Rights of the Child, art. 30, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3
[hereinafter CRC]. The United States signed the CRC in February 1995 but has not ratified it.
25 ICCPR, supra note 7, art. 18(3); see also Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance
and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, G.A. Res. 36/55 (Nov. 25, 1981) [hereinafter Declaration
on Religious Discrimination], available at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/36/a36r055.htm. See generally
Donna J. Sullivan, Gender Equality and Religious Freedom: Toward a Framework for Conflict Resolution, 24
N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 795, 814–20 (1992).
26 Universal Declaration, supra note 5, art. 16.
27 The right to marry is also recognized in ECHR, supra note 15, art. 12.
28 ICCPR, supra note 7, art. 23(4). Although equality in marriage is not addressed in Article 10 of
ICESCR, that convention addresses gender equality more generally in Article 2(2) and Article 3. See ICESCR,
supra note 6, arts. 2(2), 2(3), 2(10).
29 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Sept. 13, 1981, 1249
U.N.T.S. 13 [hereinafter CEDAW].
30 Universal Declaration, supra note 5, art. 16(2); see also ICCPR, supra note 7, art. 23(3).
24
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Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage, and Registration of
Marriage31 along with a subsequent recommendation that the legal age for
marriage should “not be less than fifteen.”32 CEDAW Article 16(2) guarantees
the right of free and full consent to marriage, and provides that “[t]he betrothal
and the marriage of a child shall have no legal effect, and all necessary action,
including legislation, shall be taken to specify a minimum age for marriage and
to make the registration of marriages in an official registry compulsory.”33
Forced marriage is also condemned in the 1956 Supplementary Convention on
the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices
Similar to Slavery.34
Laws in the United States and Canada reinforce the consent principle with
remedies that allow for an annulment or declaration of invalidity when a
marriage was procured by fraud or duress.35 In the United Kingdom and other
European countries, forced marriages in immigrant communities have been a
focus of concern and legislation,36 but the United States and Canada have not
implemented similar measures to address this problem. Although laws in some
U.S. states still allow young teenagers to marry with parental consent, most of
these also require judicial approval.37

31 Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage, and Registration of Marriages, Dec.
10, 1962, 521 U.N.T.S. 231, available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/convention.htm. See generally
Egon Schwelb, Marriage and Human Rights, 12 AMER. J. COMP. L. 337 (1963) (addressing the legal issues
and complications of the convention).
32 Recommendation on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage, and Registration of Marriages,
G.A. Res. 2018 (XX), U.N. Doc. A/6014 (Nov. 1, 1965).
33 CEDAW, supra note 29, art. 16(2).
34 1956 Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and
Practices Similar to Slavery, Sept. 7, 1956, 226 U.N.T.S. 3.
35 See, e.g., Singh v. Singh, 325 N.Y.S.2d 590, 592 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1971); B. v. L., 168 A.2d 90, 92 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1961); see also JULIEN D. PAYNE & MARILYN A. PAYNE, CANADIAN FAMILY LAW 32–37
(2d ed. 2006).
36 See, e.g., Forced Marriage Act (Civil Protection) Act 2007, c. 20, available at http://www.legislation.
gov.uk/ukpga/2007/20/contents. For a useful critique of Norway’s response to forced marriages, see Sherene
H. Razack, Imperilled Muslim Women, Dangerous Muslim Men and Civilised Europeans: Legal and Social
Responses to Forced Marriages, 12 FEMINIST LEGAL STUD. 129 (2004).
37 The common law age of consent to marriage was twelve for girls and fourteen for boys, and marriages
of younger children were sometimes upheld if the parties continued to cohabit after reaching the legal age for
marriage. See MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN NINETEENTH
CENTURY AMERICA 141–44 (1985). These ages were gradually increased by statutes in the United States. Id.
Minimum marriage ages in state law are typically eighteen, or sixteen with parental consent, but a number of
states allows marriages of even younger children. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-2-108 (2009), amended by
Act of May 15, 2009, ch. 264, § 5, 2009 Colo. Sess. Laws. 264; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 457:4 (2008); see
also Ann Laquer Estin, Embracing Tradition: Pluralism in American Family Law, 63 MD. L. REV. 540, 568
n.168 (2004).
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C. Rights of Women and Children in Families
In the Anglo-American tradition, only men held full citizenship, including
the right to vote and participate in civic life.38 The doctrine of coverture gave a
husband broad legal rights with respect to his wife’s property, earnings, and
body; fathers enjoyed similar authority over their children.39 Economic, social,
and legal norms made it difficult for wives and children to escape this
authority, even in cases of serious abuse.40 Across the world, it has taken
several centuries to begin dismantling the legal structures that sustain
patriarchal authority. Contemporary human rights law, reflected in CEDAW
and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (“CRC”), understands that
governments have some responsibility to protect dependent or vulnerable
individuals from the risk of “private” abuse.41
1. Gender Equality
CEDAW builds on the gender equality principle of the Universal
Declaration,42 the ICCPR,43 and the ICESCR.44 CEDAW Article 1 defines
“discrimination against women” to mean:
any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex
which has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the
recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of their
marital status, on a basis of equality of men and women, of human
rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social,
45
cultural, civil or any other field.

Under CEDAW Article 2, nations agree to pursue a policy of eliminating
discrimination against women “by all appropriate means and without delay.”46
This obligation is spelled out in a series of more specific commitments, such as
making constitutional changes and adopting legislation to prohibit
discrimination, as well as acting “to modify or abolish existing laws,
regulations, customs and practices which constitute discrimination against
38

BLACKSTONE, supra note 3, at 15–18.
Id. at 60.
40 See id.
41 See infra note 80 and accompanying text; see also CRC, supra note 24, art. 19; CEDAW, supra note
29, art. 1.
42 Universal Declaration, supra note 5, art. 2.
43 ICCPR, supra note 7, arts. 2(1), 2(3), 2(26).
44 ICESCR, supra note 6, arts. 2(2), 2(3).
45 CEDAW, supra note 29, art. 1.
46 Id. art. 2.
39
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women.”47 Similarly, Article 5(a) requires participating states to take steps to
modify “the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women” in
order to eliminate “prejudices and customary and all other practices” based on
the idea that either sex is superior or inferior or on stereotyped roles for men
and women.48 Article 9 mandates that women have equal rights both to
acquire, change, or retain their own nationality and with respect to the
nationality of their children.49 Focusing on family law, Article 16(1) requires
states to “take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against
women in all matters relating to marriage and family relations” and lists eight
particular areas where equality should be ensured.50
These provisions extend the coverage of CEDAW into the realm of
marriage and family law, where many legal systems still distinguish the rights
and responsibilities of women and men. Numerous countries have ratified
CEDAW without accepting the principles of gender equality in the family,
however.51 These are primarily, but not exclusively, countries with religious
family law systems, including Algeria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Egypt, India,
Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Mauritania, Morocco,
Niger, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Syria, Tunisia, and the United Arab
Emirates.52 Other CEDAW members have objected to these reservations as

47

Id. art. 2(f).
Id. art. 5(a).
49 Id. art. 9.
50 Id. art. 16(1). These are the right to enter into marriage; the right to choose a spouse and to enter into
marriage with free and full consent; rights and responsibilities during marriage and at its dissolution; rights and
responsibilities as parents, irrespective of marital status; rights to decide on the number and spacing of
children; rights and responsibilities with regard to guardianship, wardship, trusteeship, and adoption of
children; personal rights as husband and wife, including the choice of a family name, a profession, and an
occupation; and rights in respect of the ownership, acquisition, management, administration, enjoyment, and
disposition of property. Id.; see also Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Gen. Rec.
No. 21, 13th Sess. (1994) [hereinafter General Recommendation No. 21], available at http://www.un.org/
documents/ga/docs/49/plenary/a49-38.htm (affirming equality in marriage and family relations).
51 Article 28(2) of CEDAW provides that “[a] reservation incompatible with the object and purpose of
the present Convention shall not be permitted.” CEDAW, supra note 29, art. 28(2). The UN Committee on the
Elimination of Discrimination against Women takes the view that Articles 2 and 16 are core provisions of the
Convention, and, accordingly, that reservations to these provisions are contrary to the Convention and to
international law. See Reservations to CEDAW, UN.ORG, http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/
reservations.htm.
52 In addition, France, Korea, and Switzerland entered reservations to Article 16 concerning the right to
choose a family name, Ireland made a reservation concerning the rights of mothers with respect to children
born out of wedlock, and Thailand made a reservation with respect to all of Article 16. See also infra note 56
and accompanying text (proposed U.S. reservations).
48
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incompatible with the object and purpose of the convention.53 Moreover, a
General Recommendation on equality in marriage and family relations under
CEDAW by the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against
Women noted that the family laws of even those countries that had not entered
reservations still contained many measures that discriminated against women.54
Canada ratified CEDAW in 1981; the United States signed CEDAW in
1980, but has not ratified it.55 The Senate Foreign Relations Committee has
recommended that the Senate give its advice and consent to ratification,
subject to a set of reservations, understandings, and declarations designed to
maintain consistency between CEDAW and the existing law of sex equality in
the United States.56 Under current constitutional law, legislative classifications
based on gender are subject to an intermediate level of scrutiny, under which
the state must demonstrate that the law is substantially related to the
achievement of an important governmental objective.57 It is important to note,
however, that although women were accorded the right to vote in the United
States in 1920, constitutional arguments for women’s equality were not
accepted by the Supreme Court until 1971,58 and did not reach the area of
family law until 1979.59

53

See generally Michel Brandt & Jeffrey A. Kaplan, The Tension Between Women’s Rights and
Religious Rights: Reservations to CEDAW by Egypt, Bangladesh and Tunisia, 12 J.L. & RELIG. 105 (1995–96)
(discussing the tension between women’s and religious rights in CEDAW based on Islamic law); Rebecca J.
Cook, Reservations to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 30
VA. J. INT’L L. 643 (1990) (addressing the juxtaposition of the number of reservations to the integrity of the
document).
54 See General Recommendation No. 21, supra note 50.
55 State Parties, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.
aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-8&chapter=4&lang=en.
56 SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, REP. ON THE CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL
FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN, S. REP. NO., at 103–38 (1994). See Ann Elizabeth Mayer,
Reflections on the Proposed United States Reservations to CEDAW: Should the Constitution Be an Obstacle to
Human Rights? 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 727, 800–05 (1996). CEDAW was approved again in 2002, but did
not make it through the Senate. See James Dao, Senate Panel Approves Treaty Banning Bias Against Women,
N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2002, at A3.
57 See, e.g., Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 728–29 (2003).
58 Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). This followed many unsuccessful challenges. See, e.g., Goesaert v.
Cleary, 355 U.S. 464 (1948); Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299 (1915); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412
(1908); Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1873).
59 Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979) (striking statute that allowed unwed mothers but not
unwed fathers to block proposed stepparent adoption of nonmarital child); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979)
(finding that statute imposing alimony obligations only on husbands violated the Equal Protection Clause).
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2. Children’s Rights
Protections for children were included in the ICCPR and the ICESCR, and
elaborated in the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child.60 The CRC
reaffirms the broad nondiscrimination principle of the earlier conventions,61
and requires that the “best interests of the child” be a primary consideration in
all actions taken concerning children, including actions by social welfare
institutions, courts, administrative authorities, and legislative bodies.62 The
convention affirms a child’s right to preserve his or her identity, including
nationality, name, and family relations,63 and includes a series of provisions
that protects the parent-child relationship.64 Balanced against these protections
for the family, the CRC requires State Parties to protect children who are
subjected to violence, abuse, or neglect by a parent or other responsible
person,65 as well as children in circumstances such as child labor, sexual
exploitation, trafficking, and armed conflict.66
The United States signed the CRC in 1995, but remains the only country in
the world except Somalia that has failed to ratify it.67 One focal point for
opposition within the United States has been the argument that the CRC would
undermine parental rights through provisions such as the protection for a
child’s freedom of thought, conscience, and religion under Article 14.68 In this
respect, the CRC departed from the approach of the ICCPR and the 1981
Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of
Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, both of which protect the right of
parents “to ensure the religious and moral education of their children in
conformity with their own convictions.”69 Various countries have ratified the
60

See ICCPR, supra note 7, arts. 23, 24; ICESCR, supra note 6, arts. 10, 13(3).
CRC, supra note 24, art. 2(1).
62 Id. art. 3(1). Under Article 12, a child “capable of forming his or her own views” has a right to be
heard “in all matters affecting the child.” Id. art. 12.
63 Id. arts. 7, 8.
64 See id. arts. 5, 7, 9, 16, 18.
65 Id. art. 19.
66 Id. arts. 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 38, 39. These are also addressed in two Optional Protocols to the CRC. See
G.A. Res. 54/163, U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/54/49 (May 25, 2000) [hereinafter CRC Optional Protocols].
67 The United States has ratified the Optional Protocols to the CRC addressing the involvement of
children in armed conflict and the sale of children, child prostitution, and child pornography. See CRC
Optional Protocols, supra note 66.
68 Several countries have entered reservations stating that application of the CRC will be subject to
national customs or laws. See William A. Schabas, Reservations to the Convention on the Rights of the Child,
18 HUMAN RTS. Q. 472 (1996) (emphasizing that the reservations of forty-seven countries have mitigated
support for the convention).
69 ICCPR, supra note 7, art. 18. See also Declaration on Religious Discrimination, supra note 25, art. 5.
61
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CRC with reservations or declarations related to Article 14, or to the CRC
more broadly, to avoid any conflict with Islamic law.70 Another friction point
has been the requirement in Article 24(3) that State Parties “take all effective
and appropriate measures with a view to abolishing traditional practices
prejudicial to the health of children.”71 This language, in combination with
CEDAW Article 5(a), is the basis for efforts to eradicate practices such as
female genital cutting, infanticide, and early marriage and childbirth.72
Children’s rights in the United States are addressed by a patchwork of
statutory and constitutional provisions that cover many of the subjects
addressed in the CRC. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled in a series of cases that
classifications based on legitimacy or illegitimacy of birth violate the Equal
Protection Clause.73 Limitations on child labor were the subject of a long
legislative campaign, and Congress eventually approved federal laws limiting
child labor in the 1930s.74 In criminal law, the Court has held that states may
not impose the death penalty for crimes committed by children.75 The Court
has also recognized that children have some rights of free speech and religious
expression,76 and older children have some rights to make their own
reproductive or health care decisions.77 At the same time, the Court has
regularly reaffirmed the fundamental constitutional right of parents to make
decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children.78

70

See CRC, supra note 24, art. 2; Status of Ratification, Declarations and Reservations, UNITED
NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV11&chapter=4&lang=en#53.
71 See CRC, supra note 24, art. 24(3).
72 See Fact Sheet No. 23, Harmful Traditional Practices Affecting the Health of Women and Children,
UNHCHR, Aug. 1995, available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/FactSheet23en.pdf.
73 Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968). But see Nguyen v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 533
U.S. 53 (2001) (upholding a citizenship statute that requires formal acknowledgement of paternity of a nonmarital child before the child turns eighteen); Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978) (upholding a state inheritance
law that requires paternity adjudication during the father’s lifetime for an illegitimate child to inherit).
74 Restrictions on child labor were included in the 1938 Fair Labor Standards Act, which was upheld in
United States v. Darby Lumber Co., 312 U.S. 100 (1941). Cf. Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
75 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (holding that a death sentence is cruel and unusual when
imposed on a defendant who was under age eighteen at the time of the crime); see also Thompson v.
Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988) (finding that the death penalty is not permitted for crimes committed by the
defendant before the age of sixteen). These rulings removed one obstacle to ratification of the CRC, which
prohibits execution of juvenile offenders. See CRC, supra note 24, art. 37(a).
76 See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 241–49 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Tinker v. Des
Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). In these cases, the interests of parents and their children
are often conflated.
77 See, e.g., Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
78 See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65–66 (2000).
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As suggested by the large number of reservations to CEDAW and the CRC,
family law in many societies is embedded in a religious or political framework
that is not fully consistent with the norms of international human rights.79 In
addition, human rights laws reflect but do not resolve the tension between
protections for religion and the family on one side and individual rights on the
other.80 In different communities, and at different moments in history, the
shape of these conflicts has been different, but they have been more serious in
times and places when religious or family groups exercised greater social and
legal power over family members. In the United States, the tension is most
notable in both the debate over the CRC and the powerful fear that recognition
of children’s rights will diminish the authority of parents.81 The challenge for
all governments is to find an appropriate balance between support for families
and tradition and protection for potentially vulnerable family members. 82
II. PLURALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS
Within a legal regime that is committed to the protection of human rights,
culturally specific understandings of families and family law present several
distinct challenges. Government authorities have an obligation under
international law to protect family members from abusive treatment, including
violence and harmful traditional practices. Governments also have an
obligation to balance respect for culture and religion with protection from
discrimination when group members seek legislative accommodation of their
traditions, bring their disputes to be resolved in the civil courts, or challenge
traditional norms. When governments permit cultural or religious groups to
exercise official authority over their members, governments must also ensure
that the rules defining the scope of jurisdiction and group membership satisfy
the requirements of human rights.

79

See supra notes 51–54, 70, and accompanying text.
See Sullivan, supra note 25, at 795–96.
81 At one time, U.S. political discourse was marked by similar arguments that the recognition of women’s
rights would diminish the authority of their husbands. See COTT, supra note 4, at 63–69.
82 Much literature discusses the reformist aspects of early Islamic law and recent legislative reforms of
marriage laws in countries such as Tunisia, Egypt, and Morocco. See, e.g., JAMAL J. AHMAD NASIR, 1 THE
STATUS OF WOMEN UNDER ISLAMIC LAW AND MODERN ISLAMIC LEGISLATION (3d ed. 2009).
80
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A. Accommodating Family Practices
Practices such as forced marriage83 and female genital cutting,84 which are
often at the center of debates over multiculturalism and the family, are raised
and debated as public policy problems in both international law and in
countries including the United States and Canada. Debates on these issues are
complicated by the difficulties of cross-cultural communication and the
substantial risk of cultural bias and misunderstanding,85 but the principles of
international human rights law are relatively clear. CEDAW requires states to
take measures to address family violence,86 and the CRC requires states to take
measures to protect children “from all forms of physical or mental violence,
injury or abuse, neglect or negligent treatment, maltreatment or exploitation,
including sexual abuse, while in the care of parent(s), legal guardian(s) or any
other person who has the care of the child.”87 This is the province of criminal
law and child welfare law, and although “cultural defense” arguments may be
asserted in an attempt to moderate the sanctions imposed by the state, the state
clearly cannot deny protection to anyone on the basis of culture or religion.88
There is also a longstanding debate over the practice of polygamy,89 which
is often defended on the basis of culture or religion. The prospect of legalizing
polygamy is almost uniformly rejected by human rights and family law
scholars in the United States and Canada, and the UN Committee on the
Elimination of Discrimination against Women has concluded that
“[p]olygamous marriage contravenes a woman’s right to equality with men,
and can have such serious emotional and financial consequences for her and
her dependents that such marriages ought to be discouraged and prohibited.”90
In this setting, as with the problem of forced marriage, the important challenge
lies in designing remedies that do not separate families unnecessarily,
stigmatize or disparage immigrant or minority groups, or put vulnerable
individuals at greater risk.91
83

See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
See 18 U.S.C. § 116 (2006) (outlawing female genital mutilation on a child under eighteen).
85 See generally Razack, supra note 36.
86 See Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, G.A. Res. 48/104, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/48/104e (Dec. 20, 1993); Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Gen. Rec. No.
19, 11th Sess. (1992) (violence against women); Gen. Rec. No. 14, 9th Sess. (1990) (female circumcision).
87 CRC, supra note 24, art. 19(1); see DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty., 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
88 See generally ALISON DUNDES RENTELN, THE CULTURAL DEFENSE 48–72 (2004).
89 See generally MARTHA BAILEY & AMY J. KAUFMAN, POLYGAMY IN THE MONOGAMOUS WORLD:
MULTICULTURAL CHALLENGES FOR WESTERN LAW AND POLICY (2010).
90 General Recommendation No. 21, supra note 50.
91 See, e.g., BAILEY & KAUFMAN, supra note 89, at 143–87.
84
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There is more room for accommodation of cultural and religious practices
in the context of disputes over marriage, divorce, inheritance, support, or child
custody. Courts and legislatures have considered recognition of marriages
celebrated under religious (but not civil) law,92 enforcement of Muslim or
Jewish premarital agreements,93 recognition of non-judicial religious or
custody decrees obtained in another country,94 disputes surrounding religious
divorces in the Jewish tradition,95 and faith-based resolution of family
disputes.96 Judges and lawmakers are often willing to accommodate diverse
family practices, but only when this can be accomplished within the larger
framework of constitutional and human rights values, including due process,
nondiscrimination, and protection for potentially vulnerable family members.
B. The Problem of Membership
Pluralist systems, in which authority over family law matters is assigned on
the basis of religious or group membership, must have procedures for defining
and regulating group membership.97 International human rights law prohibits
discrimination on grounds including “race, colour, sex, language, religion,
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other
status.”98 For most groups, however, membership rules are closely linked to
the core of group identity, self-definition, and belief,99 and these rules are often
deeply gendered.100 Men and women may be subject to both different
92

See Estin, supra note 37, at 559–69. Note that this issue may overlap with questions of marital consent
and polygamy. See id.
93 Id. at 569–77.
94 Id. at 586–90, 593–98.
95 Id. at 578–82.
96 Id. at 582–86.
97 In the United States, Native American groups, many of which are federally recognized, set their own
criteria for membership. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978). Federally recognized tribes
have jurisdiction over their members for various purposes, including family law.
98 Universal Declaration, supra note 5, art. 2; see also CRC, supra note 24, art. 2(1); ICCPR, supra note
7, art. 2(1); ICESCR, supra note 6, art. 2(2). In Canada, the Charter of Rights and Freedoms affirms broad
equality rights and prohibits discrimination on these and other grounds. Canadian Charter, supra note 9, art.
15(1) (“Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal protection and equal
benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based on race, national or
ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.”).
99 See, e.g., Gershom Gorenberg, How Do You Prove You’re a Jew?, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Mar. 2, 2008, at
46.
100 The Jewish tradition traces membership through the mother’s line, while the Muslim tradition looks to
the father’s line. A child with a Muslim father and Jewish mother would be claimed by both groups, while a
child with a Jewish father and a Muslim mother would be claimed by neither. See id. at 48; see also Clark
Hoyt, Commentary, The Public Editor: Entitled to Their Opinions, Yes. But Their Facts?, N.Y. TIMES, June 1,
2008, at WK 12.
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constraints and sanctions if they violate group marriage norms, and different
rights with respect to their children’s membership.101 Group membership may
also be shaped in other ways that would constitute discrimination if practiced
by a state.
For a state that is committed both to protecting religious and cultural rights
and to preventing discrimination, accommodating group membership rules is
extremely difficult. Rules that restrict religious intermarriage102 violate the
right to marry and the nondiscrimination principle.103 Rules that deny nonmarital children the right to claim a relationship with, or financial support,
from their birth fathers also violate human rights law.104 In both Jewish and
Muslim tradition, divorce laws impose particular constraints on women, so that
some women are unable to leave a marriage and remarry without also leaving
their religious community.105
Any group membership rules that are recognized or enforced by the state
must allow for both affiliation with and exit from the group.106 The exit
question is particularly complicated in the Muslim tradition, which encourages
conversion to Islam but treats leaving Islam as apostasy.107 This issue
intersects with other family law questions, particularly in the circumstances of
intermarriage108 and divorce.109

101 CEDAW, supra note 29, art. 9; see also Daphna Hacker, Inter-Religious Marriage in Israel: Gendered
Implications for Conversion, Children, and Citizenship, 14 ISR. STUD. 178, 185 (2009). On the role of family
law in constructing group identity, see AYELET SHACHAR, MULTICULTURAL JURISDICTIONS: CULTURAL
DIFFERENCES AND WOMEN’S RIGHTS 45–62 (2001).
102 Muslim women are prohibited from marrying non-Muslims. See NASIR, supra note 82, at 85–86;
MUSLIM-NON-MUSLIM MARRIAGE: POLITICAL AND CULTURAL CONTESTATIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 1–4
(Gavin W. Jones et al. eds., 2009); Noryamin Aini, Inter-Religious Marriage from Socio-Historical Islamic
Perspectives, 2008 BYU L. REV. 669 (2008); Hacker, supra note 101; Sullivan, supra note 25.
103 See supra note 27 and accompanying text; Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
104 See supra note 73 and accompanying text; NASIR, supra note 82, at 169–70.
105 See Estin, supra note 37, at 578–86.
106 See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 7, art. 18 (“Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought,
conscience and religion; this right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice.”).
In the family law context, see Abbo v. Briskin, 660 So. 2d 1157, 1159 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995). See also
SHACHAR, supra note 101, at 122–26.
107 See generally Andrea Elliott, In Kabul, a Test for Shariah, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2006, § 4, at 3.
108 See Hoyt, supra note 100 (discussing the controversy regarding whether Barack Obama should be
considered a Muslim by birth and his Christian affiliation as apostasy).
109 Conversions are sometimes obtained to forum shop, particularly because divorce is more readily
available under Muslim law than in the Christian tradition. For one example, see Nadim Audi, Egyptian Court
Allows Return to Christianity, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2008, at A11.
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Cultures vary over time and across communities. Diversity within cultural
and religious groups can be an important source of strength and vitality, but
poses other challenges for a system with official membership rules. In the
United Kingdom, where there is an official Chief Rabbi, the question of group
membership recently reached the Supreme Court.110 The court rejected an
admission policy of a state-supported Jewish school that followed a strict
orthodox definition of membership that excluded a child whose mother had
converted to Judaism in a non-orthodox Masorti synagogue.111 One risk (or
benefit) of formal legal pluralism is that tradition may become frozen in
orthodox institutional and legal structures. Another risk (or benefit) is that
changes in traditional or religious law may be accomplished by legislation or
judicial ruling. For example, a number of Muslim countries have imposed
constraints on polygamy,112 and the courts and legislature in South Africa have
moved customary law toward greater protections for women’s equality.113
In conditions of official legal pluralism, membership and boundary issues
become conflict of laws problems, requiring a legal framework of laws for
families that form across group boundaries, including families that belong to
multiple legal systems and families that fall in between. When systems of law
overlap, individuals may find that they are married for some purposes but not
for others.114 When family laws differ between groups in significant respects,
for example with respect to polygamy or divorce, there is the question of
whether individuals can forum shop by changing their group affiliations.115
Because membership rules and rules regarding marriage outside the group are
strongly gendered, however, men and women may experience different
pressures and opportunities to convert.116
Any system giving legal effect to religious law or the actions of religious
authorities in the United States or Canada would have to address these conflict
of laws questions within the larger framework of constitutional rules protecting

110

R.(E) v. Governing Body of JFS [2009] UKSC 15.
See id. (holding that denial of admission constituted discrimination under the Race Relations Act
1976). Two of the nine justices dissented. All members of the court agreed that the school could premise
admission on genuine religious adherence and practice, which was not disputed in this case. Id.
112 See NASIR, supra note 82, at 25–28.
113 See RAN HIRSCHL, CONSTITUTIONAL THEOCRACY 185–95 (2010).
114 See, e.g., E.I. NWOGUGU, FAMILY LAW IN NIGERIA 66–69 (rev. ed. 1990) (discussing the interaction of
statutory and customary law marriage); see also Estin, supra note 10, at 459–62.
115 See, e.g., Audi, supra note 109.
116 See Hacker, supra note 101.
111
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freedom of religion.117 Arguments might be made to allow individuals to
contract or opt in to a system of religious authority, as is sometimes done with
religious arbitration of divorce disputes, but this would also require provisions
that allow individuals to opt out again.118 The case law in both countries
suggests some willingness to enforce agreements to submit disputes to
religious authorities,119 but such agreements may not be enforceable if one of
the parties subsequently objects on religious grounds.120
A system of official pluralism, where legal rights depend on group
membership, also challenges the unity and cohesion of the broader society. In
the United States, the long struggle to extend full citizenship rights to men
without property, freed slaves, Native Americans, and women underlines the
importance of an inclusive vision of membership. Our idealization of America
as a nation of immigrants is bound up with values that have strongly promoted
assimilation into a single polity and shared set of basic values.121 Against this
background, a pluralism that entrenches differences with jurisdictional or legal
boundaries risks undermining the collective identity central to the core of our
nationhood.
From this perspective, the membership issue is the core problem of legal
pluralism. As author Ran Hirschl observes, “religious and customary leaders
relying on sacred texts or oral traditions,” who offer an alternative to the
institutions of the state, may be “perceived as challenging or defying the state
law’s ultimate authority over a given territory and its citizenry.”122 For this
reason, even nations committed to pluralism and multicultural accommodation
“are not keen on autonomous, rival adjudicative systems that derive their
authority and morality from sources external and prior to, and in some cases
insulated from, secular law.”123
117

See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
See Estin, supra note 10, at 463–70; SHACHAR, supra note 101, at 103–09.
119 See, e.g., Bruker v. Marcovitz [2007] 3 S.C.R. 607 (Can.).
120 Cf. Marriage of Goldman, 554 N.E.2d 1016 (Ill. Ct. App. Ct. 1990); see also Marriage of Victor, 866
P.2d 899, 902 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993); Aflalo v. Aflalo, 685 A.2d 523, 531 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1996). In the custody
context, see, for example, Marriage of Weiss, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 339 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (refusing to enforce
parents’ agreement to raise children in the Jewish faith) and Abbo v. Briskin, 660 So. 2d 1157, 1159–61 (Fla.
Dist, Ct. App. 1995) (same). On the general problem of secular approaches to religious questions, see Jared
Goldstein, Is There a “Religious Question” Doctrine? Judicial Authority to Examine Religious Practices and
Beliefs, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 497 (2005).
121 Native American communities, which retain some aspects of self-governance, can be distinguished
from other minority groups because they are not immigrants.
122 HIRSCHL, supra note 113, at 185–86.
123 Id.
118
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CONCLUSION
Laws in the United States prioritize protection for individual human rights
over the group rights that shape cultural or religious pluralism. This reflects an
understanding of citizenship that has become broader and more inclusive over
several centuries. Changes to the law of domestic relations have been an
important aspect of this transformation, as activists, legislatures, and courts
have slowly dismantled the legal framework that denied full membership to
women and fostered or tolerated other types of discrimination grounded in
tradition. The process is not complete, particularly with respect to protection
against private violence. In countries such as the United States and Canada,
this process reflects the emerging understanding that family law is not exempt
from broader norms of equality and human rights.
Just as the state cannot place “the family” outside the realm of human
rights, it cannot invoke pluralism to insulate social and legal practices from
human rights scrutiny. Religious groups are not subject to international law
and have no legal obligation to protect human rights. But when religion and the
state are intertwined, when governments endorse or enforce the laws and
practices of private or religious actors, those governments bear secondary
responsibility for violations of human rights within those spheres. For this
reason, pluralist regimes in which religious or other groups exercise official
authority but operate autonomously from the state pose particularly difficult
challenges in ensuring respect for human rights.
This Essay argues that pluralism in family law presents two types of
challenges. One concerns substantive practices permitted in religious or
customary law that violate international human rights law. These practices
must be regulated in pluralist nations and fall outside the boundaries of
accommodation in countries, such as the United States and Canada, where
customary and religious laws operate on an unofficial basis. The other
challenge of family law pluralism is inherent in the project of dividing citizens
into separate groups based on factors such as religion or ethnicity. Beyond the
human rights issues that this presents, it is legally and politically problematic
for nations committed to the ideals of equality and universal citizenship.

